Anonymous
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9/24/2004 18:00:54
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 Subject: Crown Prince Abdulla Peace Plan
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Contrary to common belief, Saudi Arabia has been no stranger to the peace process, albeit usually behind the scenes. As Aluf Benn commented in Israel’s Ha’aretz (Feb. 19), a U.S. official reportedly advised the Israeli government “[to] lay off Saudi Arabia. It’s not your enemy….Saudi Arabia may be extremist in religion, but it is politically very moderate, and it’s important not to act against it.” Abdullah has been credited in both the Arab and American press with being the impetus for President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell to verbalize their vision of a Palestinian state.
While the reaction to Abdullah’s peace proposal has been tremendous, the offer contains nothing new. It essentially advocates the guidelines of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which also formed the basis of the September 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the PLO and undergirded the Oslo peace accords.
Arab and Israeli analysts have pored over the Saudi plan to divine its significance for such thorny issues as secure borders for Israel, the status of the Golan Heights, and the right of return of Palestinian refugees to their pre-1948 homes in present-day Israel. In this vein, Tariq Musarwah warned in Al-Ra’i (Feb. 21), “The problem which we have repeated…has been subdividing the [Arab-Israel] conflict into disparate elements, between [Israeli] withdrawal from occupied lands and withdrawal from the [West Bank and Gaza] territories.”
Abdullah’s initiative contained a number of important subtexts. First, the offer was not made directly to Israel but leaked to Friedman, who is seen by the Arab press as a proxy for Bush. Musarwah of Al-Ra’i put it bluntly: “It was directed to the United States and not to Israel” (Feb. 19). Arab commentators view Abdullah’s leak as a goad to the Bush administration to become more active in the peace process. Writers such as Yasser al-Za’atirah in Al-Dustour (Feb. 14) and Sulayman Arabiyat in Al-Ra’i (Feb. 26) emphasized Friedman’s role as a go-between for the White House and Arab leaders.
Second, numerous Arab writers noted that Abdullah’s proposal vitiates the long-standing claim that Arab states have neither worked for peace initiatives nor desired peace with Israel. Ghazi al-Qusaybi, the Saudi ambassador in London, wrote in an op-ed in Al-Quds (Feb. 20) that Abdullah’s proposal silences critics who have suggested that Arab leaders always look to the United States for a solution to their problems.
Third, Abdullah’s proposal arose at least in part to ease Saudi Arabia’s uncomfortable position in post-Sept. 11 global politics. A Feb. 26 Ha’aretz editorial took this perspective: “[T]here is nothing like a conciliatory gesture toward Israel to improve the image of a fundamentalist, Muslim dictatorship.” The proposal succeeded in deflecting the intensely critical interna-tional media scrutiny from Saudi Arabia.
Fourth, the Saudi plan renewed international scrutiny of Israel’s motives. Abdullah was essentially daring Israel to fulfill the DOP: If Israel truly wanted peace, then why delay the fulfillment of the DOP for so long? Abdullah’s offer would have no timetables or delays, which have proved ineffective in the past. This is Israel’s historic opportunity to settle the conflict and conclude peace with the most important regional economic and Islamic state in concert with other Arab states. Furthermore, as Ma’an Abu Nuwar wrote in Al-Ra’i (Feb. 28), Sharon’s avoidance of this new peace initiative would jeopardize his government and reflect badly on Israel’s supposed desire for peace with its neighbors.
 
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